text: In the case of Taiwan, integrated deterrence would likely result in performative condemnation of China’s actions along with a new set of red lines in the Pacific focused on protecting Australia and Japan. U.S. Navy Carrier Strike GroupShould the U.S. decide to respond militarily, expect the forward deployment of additional carrier and amphibious task forces into the Pacific. Additional USAF and US Army units would likely be forward-deployed to Japan, Guam and Australia. From a military perspective, the timeline for deployment of additional forces is much longer than China’s timeline for an assault on Taiwan. Indications and warnings (I&W) of an impending amphibious and airborne operation against Taiwan would be sparse since many of China’s combat units and naval vessels are permanently stationed in close proximity to the Taiwan Straits. It is reasonable to conclude that the U.S may receive seven to ten days of I&W prior to the launch of an operation against Taiwan, whereas it would take double or even triple that to reposition significant additional forces in the Pacific. Currently deployed forces would not be sufficient to counter a PLA corps-level amphibious and airborne assault on Taiwan. The likelihood of an attempt to dislodge PLA forces already dug in on Taiwan is miniscule owing to the probability of escalation and the improbability of success.Simply put, the U.S. will not be able to counter China’s attack on Taiwan by reacting or waiting until the first PLA ships and planes cross the Taiwan straits. Instead, the U.S. would need to preposition forces in the Pacific in advance of I&W – something already ruled out in the recent DoD Global Posture Review. Additionally, with intelligence agencies forecasting a Russian attack on Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. may choose to forego attempts to counter China in a near-term assault on Taiwan, and instead look to mitigate any further damage in the Pacific under a new status quo. If the U.S. fails to halt China’s move on Taiwan, the result will be a reordering of the status quo and geopolitical alliances in the Pacific and potentially world-wide. After all, if the U.S. can brush away its security promises to Taiwan, who is to say they would not do the same to any other nation with which they have made similar promises? In any scenario, the U.S. will likely begin to decouple its economy from China and near-shore its manufacturing, as is already happening in response to COVID-19 impacts. The U.S. will lead with various sanctions against China, most of which will focus on key national and business leaders, as well as inward-facing Chinese corporations, in an effort to reduce effects on the U.S. economy. The U.S. will also likely remove recently enacted regulatory restrictions on transportation and domestic oil and gas production in order to streamline supply chains and counter rising prices from renewed competition in the global market. Additionally, expect a significant change in leadership in the U.S. and a loss of international prestige as a result of the failure to protect national interests in the Pacific. RecommendationsU.S. businesses can front-run this conflict by seeking new suppliers outside of Asia. Those with manufacturing concerns in China should seek alternate manufacturing means and locations in geographical areas not subject to Chinese control or manipulation. U.S. consumers should anticipate major disruptions in supply chains and build up at least a 90 days’ worth of essential food and supplies.